JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT UNDER RULE 10b-5:
AN END TO THE RULE AS LAW?
The extended stock market slump of the early 1970s' caused
many corporations to reconsider the advantages of public ownership.
A number of corporations reacted to depressed stock prices by "going
private" 2 -withdrawing their stock from active public trading through a
tender offer or merger,3 thereby "squeezing out" minority shareholders
and freeing the corporation from regulation by the Securities and Ex-

change Commission.4 This wave of going private transactions has been
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 (1967, with Supps.)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG];
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Loss];
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act];
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1970) [hereinafter cited as
1934 Act];
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) [hereinafter
cited as section 10(b)];
Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 [hereinafter cited as
rule lob-5].
1. In January, 1973, the Dow Jones Industrial Index stood at a record high of
1051. By October, 1974 the Index stood at 577-its lowest since 1962. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1974, at 53, col. 6.
2. "Going private" has been the subject of considerable recent commentary. See,
e.g., Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 987
(1974); Brudney, A Note on Going Private, 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); O'Neal &
Janke, Utilizing Rule 10b-5 for Remedying Squeeze-Outs or Oppression of Minority
Shareholders, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 327 (1975); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE
L.J. 903 (1975); "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, Address by
SEC Commissioner H.A. Sommer, Jr., Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame
Univ. Law School, Nov. 1974, reprinted in [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 80,010.
The SEC currently has under consideration proposed rules which would govern
going private. See Proposed Rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, Exchange Act Release No.
11231 (Feb. 6, 1975), 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1M 23,704-05, explained in Securities
Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975), [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
80,104. At present, no hearings on the proposed rules have been scheduled.
REP.
Telephone conversation with Office of the Secretary, SEC, August 23, 1976.
3. Other techniques which may be used to go private include a sale of assets or
a reverse stock split. See O'Neal & Janke, supra note 2. See F. O'NEAL, "SQuEEZEOuis" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 57-408 (1975) for a detailed discussion of the
various techniques available.
4. Section 12(g)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970), requires corporations with total assets over $1,000,000 and more than 500 shareholders to register
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accompanied by increasing recourse to the federal courts by disappointed
minority shareholders who had purchased stock at higher prices during
more prosperous times and subsequently found themselves outside the

corporation, holding only a claim to the current market value of their
former equity interest.
Squeezed-out minority shareholders have met with success in two
recent Second Circuit decisions, Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.' and
Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc."

The solicitude shown the plain-

with the Securities Exchange Commission. Once registered with the SEC, a corporation
must comply with section 13 (requiring periodic reports) and section 14 (regulating
proxies), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1970). Expenses associated with remaining public and
complying with the reporting requirements have been estimated to be as high as
$100,000 per year. Heishman, Going Private-Or How to Squeeze Investors, DuN's
RmEw, Jan. 1975, at 37. For a more complete discussion of the rule and the cost
of compliance, see Swanson, The Elimination of Public Shareholders: Going Private,
7 CONN. L. REv. 609, 613-17 (1975). Mr. Swanson, a staff attorney with the SEC,
offers several expense estimates from SEC hearings and from correspondence the SEC
has received from corporations. Id. at 615.
5. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3720 (U.S. June
8, 1976). In Marshel, the plaintiff was one of some 1,000 public shareholders who
owned approximately 32 percent of Concord Fabrics, Inc. The other 68 percent of the
stock was owned by the Weinstein family. Although the stock was issued at $15 per
share, by late 1974 the shares were trading at $1. The Weinsteins resolved to take Concord private by organizing a shell corporation, AFW, to which they transferred their
Concord stock in return for 100 percent of the stock of the new corporation. Their
initial plan called for a tender offer, to be followed by the merger of AFW and Concord,
thus "squeezing out" the nontendering shareholders, who were to receive $3 for their
shares. Since approval of the merger by shareholder vote was a foregone conclusion because of the Weinstein holdings, Marshel sought an injunction in federal district court to
halt the merger. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). On appeal from the
denial, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.
1976). Writing for the court, Judge Hays held that the use of corporate funds by majority shareholders for the sole purpose of eliminating minority shareholders operated as a
fraud and therefore constituted a violation of rule lOb-5 (see text of rule at note 7 infra).
In a companion case in the state courts, the New York Attorney General sought and
obtained an injunction against the merger. People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc.
2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd - App. Div. 2d -, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App.
Div. 1975).
6. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S. May
14, 1976). In Green, Santa Fe Industries, the 95 percent owner of Kirby Lumber Co.,
transferred its Kirby stock to the newly organized Forest Products, Inc., in exchange
for all the new company's stock. Pursuant to the Delaware short-form merger statute,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1975), the Board of Directors of Forest Products authorized a merger with Kirby which eliminated Kirby's minority shareholders and allowed
them $150 per share for their stock. Claiming that the fair value of his stock was some
$772 per share, Green brought suit for rescission of the merger and for damages. The
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to allege any nondisclosures by defendants. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the use of the short-form merger for the sole purpose
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tiffs' claims under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 7 in Marshel and Green
is typical of the expansive 10b-5 jurisprudence of the 1960s and early

1970s. This Note will discuss the viability of continued expansion of
10b-5 relief in light of two recent Supreme Court decisions which indicate a more restrictive attitude toward private actions under 10b-5. 8
of eliminating the minority shareholders constituted a breach of the majority's fiduciary
duty and thus violated rule 10b-5. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). The court's opinions
in Marshel and Green emphasized that the primary objection to the defendant's action
was that it lacked a corporate purpose and benefitted only the controlling shareholders.
533 F.2d at 1280-82; 533 F.2d at 1286-88, 1290. Green distinguished Popkin v. Bishop,
464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), on the ground that the merger approved by the court in
Popkin had been required by the terms of a settlement in a prior case and therefore fulfilled the corporate purpose test. 533 F.2d at 1291.
Rehearing en banc was denied in Green and Marshel. See Green v. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1976).
In Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 568-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974), the Fifth Circuit had discussed a similar corporate purpose test in the
context of a lob-5 action. Since adequate support was found in state law and general
equity principles, however, the court's holding in favor of the plaintiff minority shareholder was not entirely dependent on the application of that test, as it was in Green and
Marshel.
7. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
• . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1970).
Rule lOb-5, promulgated under this section, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
The SEC adopted rule 10b-5 to fill a perceived gap in the protection of sellers of securities. Buyers had been specifically provided for by section 17 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). The language of rule 10b-5 is substantially the same
as that of section 17. At the time it was promulgated, the SEC expressed no intent to
create a private right of action. It was assumed that the rule would be used by the SEC
primarily as authority for injunctions in connection with its enforcement actions. By
1947 a federal court had implied a private right of action. Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa.
1947). The Supreme Court acknowledged the private right in its second case involving
10b-5, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
For specific comments by one of the drafters of rule 10b-5 on the events surrounding its
adoption, see Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW.
793, 922 (1967). See generally 1 BROM3ERG §§ 2.2 (400-450); 6 Loss 3869-73.
8. This attitude appears also to extend to other sections of the securities laws.
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The trend toward liberal interpretation of section 10(b) and rule
"10b-5 which has emerged in the courts of appeals over the last decade 9

has been premised largely upon the view that the securities statutes
are remedial in nature and therefore must be construed flexibly to

protect investors. 10 With respect to section 10(b), the liberal approach

taken by the circuits could claim some early support from Supreme

Court decisions construing other sections of the securities statutes. 1
The Supreme Court itself took an expansive view of the statute when
it first considered rule lOb-5 in SEC v. National Securities, Inc. 2 In
deciding whether the fraudulent conduct sought to be enjoined by the

SEC involved a "purchase" or "sale" of securities, the Court noted that
the statutory definitions of those terms were "unhelpful,"' 3 and concluded that the proper inquiry was whether the "alleged conduct is
the type of fraudulent behavior which was meant to be forbidden by
the statute and the rule."14 A consideration of the alleged fraudulent

conduct by defendants in National Securities led to the conclusion that
See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976) (standard of materiality under rule 14a-9); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975) (definition of security).
9. See note 77 infra.
10. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974) (10b-5
violated by negligence), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724
(9th Cir. 1974) (10b-5 cases judged under "flexible duty" standard); Eason v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974) (standing not restricted to buyers and sellers).
The very existence of a private right of action under lob-5 was long a subject of
scholarly debate. The leading articles on both sides of the dispute are listed in Ruder,
Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing
to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289 n.4 (1971).
11. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), Justice
Goldberg, writing for the Court, stated: "Congress intended the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of
avoiding frauds,' not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes." Id. at 195 (footnote omitted). Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967) (Warren, C.J.), a case construing the meaning of the term "security" under
section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, also provided support: "[W]e are guided by the
familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed
broadly to effectuate its purposes. The Securities Exchange Act quite clearly falls into
the category of remedial legislation." Id. at 336 (footnote omitted).
12. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The National Securities case involved an action brought
by the SEC under rule lob-5 rather than a private action. At issue was whether alleged
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts communicated to insurance company
shareholders in an effort to secure approval of a planned merger fell within the coverage
of section 10b and rule lob-5. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 751 n.14 (1975), the Court noted that this earlier decision "established that the
purchaser-seller rule imposes no limitation on the standing of the SEC to bring actions
for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5."
13. 393 U.S. at 466.
14. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
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"[t]he broad antifraud purposes of the statute and the rule would clearly

be furthered by their application to this type of situation."' 5 In a dissent which has proved prophetic of the Supreme Court's current ap-

proach to lOb-5 questions,:' Justice Harlan expressed concern over the
Court's eagerness to read rule lOb-5 "as a sweeping prohibition against
nullities
fraud in the securities industry when this results in rendering
17

of the other antifraud provisions of more limited scope.'
The initial lOb-5 decision in National Securities was followed by
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.18 and
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,'9 both of which employed a
flexible interpretation of the rule and expanded the scope of the private

right of action. In Bankers Life, the Court applied section 10(b) to a
unique fraudulent scheme by holding that the deceptive practice need

only "touch" on a sale of securities to be actionable under the federal
securities laws;20 classic securities fraud need not be an intrinsic part

of the sale on which federal jurisdiction is predicated. In Ute, the Court
15. Id.
16. See text accompanying notes 22-23 infra.
17. 393 U.S. at 470. Justice Harlan identified Judge Jerome Frank and Professors
Louis Loss and Milton Cohen as participants in the debate over lOb-5's coverage who
had warned against the result which the Court appeared to accept. See Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J.); 3 Loss 1778-92;
Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340, 1366, 1370 n.89 (1966).
The Harlan dissent cited sections 11(a), 12(2) and 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
77k(a), 771(2), 77m (1970), and section 18 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970), as
examples of limited antifraud provisions. Section 11(a) explicitly limits the right of action to purchasers and sellers, while the other sections cited impose procedural limitations
which are lacking for actions brought under section 10. Sections 12(2) (operating
through the provisions of section 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970)) and 18 include
a security for costs provision absent in section 10(b). See McClure v. Borne Chemical
Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); 1 BROMBERG § 2.5(2). Similarly, sections 13
and 18 operate under a shortened statute of limitations, while 10(b) utilizes the statute
of the forum state, which is usually more liberal than that provided by sections 13
and 18. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1389 n.29 (1976), citing
3 Loss 1773-74.
The importance of these limitations was discussed extensively in Ernst & Ernst,
96 S. Ct. at 1388-89. They are fundamental to Justice Powell's argument that the
Securities Acts are carefully drawn and that expansion of the scope of rule lOb-5
actions should not be allowed to nullify this careful drafting. See notes 39-40 infra
and accompanying text.
18. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
19. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
20. 404 U.S. at 12-13. The conduct held actionable was a complex scheme whereby a company was fraudulently induced to use its own assets to fund a purchase of its
securities by an outside party. The Court's use of the word "touch" represented a
broad construction of the phrase "in connection with" a purchase or sale, found in both
section 10(b) and rule lob-5. See note 7 supra. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, did not consider 10(b)'s relationship to other sections of the statute.
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held that reliance on a misrepresentation need not be specifically proved
by a 10b-5 plaintiff; in the view of the Court, a sufficient showing of
reliance is made upon proof of nondisclosure of a "material" fact, defined as information which "a reasonable investor might have considered . . . important in the making of [his] decision" to buy or sell
shares.2 1
When Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the Court in 1972,

the concern over expansion of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 expressed
by Justice Harlan 22 in National Securities gained two powerful spokesmen. Each has recently authored a lengthy majority opinion in an
effort to show that a proper interpretation of the statute and rule requires more than an awareness of the remedial purpose of the securities laws. Both stressed the importance of studying the interrelated
components of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the need for respecting

the particular remedies and standards of fault which Congress created
in those Acts.2 3
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,24 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Birnbaum rule, which mandates that a plaintiff be a
21. 406 U.S. at 153-54. The complaint arose out of th6 administration of a federal
program to partition and distribute the assets of the Ute Tribe between whole-blood
and mixed-blood members. As part of the program, mixed-bloods seeking to dispose
of their shares in the tribe's oil and mineral rights were required to give first-refusal
rights to the whole-blood membership. The fraudulent misstatements consisted of
assertions by officers of a transfer agent bank to prospective mixed-blood sellers that the
price being offered was the market price, when the latter was in fact significantly higher.
In holding that the plaintiffs need not show that they relied on the defendants' nondisclosures, the Court eliminated one of the elements of common law fraud which had been
thought to apply to actions under 10b-5. See 3 Loss at 1435-36.
The Court has recently indicated that the language in the case which purported to
define "material" is no longer a complete and authoritative statement of the law. TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2126, 2132 n.9 (1976).
22. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text. Professor Bromberg has recently stated the case even more strongly:
I think it is well to look on lob-5 with a hard, realistic eye as being a kind
of carte blanche to the federal courts to create what we talked about a few years
ago as common law corporate responsibility, and what I would like to suggest
seems to be, more broadly, common law standards for financial transactions.
I think the development has gone on with virtually no statutory basis.
That is barely a pretext now ....
K. BIALKIN & H. END3ERG, THE 10B SmUES oF RULES 50 (Practising Law Institute 1975).
23. See notes 29, 39-40 infra and accompanying text.
24. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). In Blue Chip, plaintiffs, as a result of an antitrust
consent decree, were given an opportunity to purchase shares of the Blue Chip Stamp
Company at a set price. They did not purchase, allegedly because of an overly pessimistic prospectus which was designed to discourage them so that the shares could be
offered to the public at a higher price. 421 U.S. at 726-27. The Ninth Circuit found
that plaintiffs had standing to sue, notwithstanding the Birnbaum rule which restricted
standing to buyers and sellers. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136
(9th Cir. 1973). The court reasoned that the status of an offeree was similar to that
of a party with contract rights who is protected under the statutory definition of "buy"
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purchaser or seller of securities in order to have standing to sue under
rule lOb-5. 5 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist traced the
rise of the implied private right of action under 10b-5, 26 outlining the
development of the Birnbaum rule and its application by the courts of
appeals. 2
He then discussed the "congressional scheme" as reflected
by the text of the statute and the available extrinsic evidence.28 Despite
considerable evidence within the statute to support his position, 9 Jusand "sell." 492 F.2d at 141-42; 1934 Act §§ 3(a)(13-14), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13-14).
The Supreme Court reversed in a lengthy opinion. Justice Blackmun argued in dissent
that the Court's decision disregarded the broad purpose of the 1934 Act, 421 U.S. at
765, and that the Court's consideration of policy, see notes 31-34 infra and accompanying text, was inappropriate. Id. at 769-71.
25. The Birnbaum rule, established in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2d Cir.) (A. Hand, J.) cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), restricted standing for
the private right of action under 10b-5 to purchasers and sellers of securities. The rule
had been extensively criticized by commentators, although it had some supporters.
See Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TExAs 1. REV.
617, 623, 648-49 (1971) (supporting the rule); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. I REV. 268 (1968). For an extensive
listing of commentary on the rule, see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 47, 267 nn.40 & 41 (1975).
Despite this criticism, the rule had been generally followed. Only the Seventh
Circuit had rejected it outright. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d
654, 661 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
Various
exceptions to the rule had evolved in its twenty-year existence. See Gallagher, 10b-5
After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DIcK. L. REV. 1, 8-22
(1975); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HAirV. L REV. 47, 267-68 (1975).
Until Blue Chip, the Supreme Court had consistently refused to grant certiorari on
Birnbaum questions, despite the conflict in the circuits. Compare Eason v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974) (rejecting the rule), with Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (following Birnbaum).
26. See note 7 supra.
27. 421 U.S. at 731-33. See note 25 supra.
28. Id. at 733-36. See note 17 supra.
29. Justice Rehnquist's construction was based on his conviction that the Securities
Acts are "carefully drawn." 421 U.S. at 730, 733 n.5. Where Congress included
a particular provision in one section of the statute and omitted it in a parallel section,
Justice Rehnquist would regard the omission as intended by Congress. Contradictions
and omissions must, therefore, be carefully noted and respected. The end result of
such a construction could be the destruction of the private right of action under those
sections, including 10(b), where it is not mentioned explicitly. In discussing the application of this "doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius" to the five general
antifraud provisions of the securities statutes and rules (sections 11(a), 12(2) and 17(a)
of the 1933 Act and rules 15cl-2 and 10b-5), Professor Bromberg noted that the doctrine "has a respectable history and logic." 1 BROMBERG § 2.4(1) at 27. He concluded,
however, that "the history of lOb-5 is a massive rejection of this approach." The
insistence of Justices Rehnquist and Powell on the importance of this type of statutory
construction represents a major change in the method of analyzing 10b-5 questions.
See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the doctrine of
expressio unius, see 2A A. SUTrEDER.AD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.23-.25 (4th
ed. 1974).
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tice Rehnquist confessed to doubts about his ability to "divine from

the language of section 10(b) the express 'intent of Congress.' "I' Accordingly, in view of the judicially-implied nature of the private action
under section 10(b), Justice Rehnquist found it appropriate for the
Court to weigh policy considerations in delimiting its bounds.31 Finding
significant policy reasons for retaining the Birnbau~m limitation on
10b-5 actions, he nevertheless acknowledged that the plaintiffs in Blue
Chip could be granted relief without causing the problems envisioned
under a complete repudiation of the Birnbaum rule.32 Justice Rehnquist
rejected such an expedient, arguing that a narrow decision would leave
the "purchaser or seller" requirement open to "endless case-by-case

erosion"3 3 and provide an unsatisfactory rule of liability for future
business transactions.34

Justice Rehnquist demonstrated the use of this approach in his argument for
retaining the Birnbaum rule by noting that the wording of section 10(b)--"in connection
with the purchase or sale"-contrasts with the wording of section 17(a), the parallel
antifraud section of the 1933 Act--"in the offer or sale" (emphasis added). Section
16(b) of the 1934 Act provides a right of action to recover insider profits to shareholders who have neither purchased nor sold. By contrast, Justice Rehnquist emphasized, the express non-derivative private civil remedies created by Congress in
sections 11(a) and 12 of the 1933 Act and sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act are "by
their terms expressly limited to purchasers and sellers." 421 U.S. at 736. Justice
Rehnquist then concluded that "it would indeed be anamolous to impute to Congress
an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially implied cause of action [rule
lOb-5] beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express causes of action." Id.
30. 421 U.S. at 737.
31. Id. Justice Powell's concurrence emphasized the text and legislative history,
and the text of the rule, suggesting that he would have decided the case on these
factors alone. Id. at 755-57. The concurrence illustrates the contrast between the
Powell-Rehnquist approach and the earlier method of lOb-5 analysis; in response
to Justice Blackmun's charge of "callousness toward the investing public," Justice
Powell replied that "[olur task in this case is to construe a statute." See id. at 760,
762. See also Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232
(1976) (evincing a similar attitude toward the extension of liability in cases brought
under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8p (1970)).
32. 421 U.S. at 755. Justice Rehnquist emphasized the threat of "vexatious" litigation prompted by the settlement value of lOb-5 suits. The vast majority of reported
lob-5 cases, including Marshel and Green, are appeals from a dismissal; such cases are
often settled before trial on the merits. See id. at 740; 1 BROMBERG § 1.3(2). But
see Bromberg, Are There Limits to l0b-5?, 29 Bus. LAw. 167 (1974) (suggesting
that more cases are being brought to trial). On a related point, the Court expressed
concern over the "disruption of normal business activities" caused by frivolous suits.
421 U.S. at 743. This disruption would be increased, according to Justice Rehnquist, by
use of the "shifting and highly fact oriented" standard which would accompany abandonment of Birnbaum. Id. at 755. The Court's fear for the instability of the standard
which would arise if the Birnbaum rule were rejected was based on its belief that judicial
outcomes would "turn largely on which oral version of a series of occurrences the jury
may decide to credit." Id. at 742.
33. Id. at 754.
34. Id. at 755.
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In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,35 the Court held that an allega-

tion of mere negligent misconduct by the defendant was insufficient
to sustain an action under lOb-5. 36 Delivering the opinion of the
Court, Justice Powell found adequate support in the text of section

10(b) for the conclusion that Congress did not intend that 10(b) remedies be applied except where some form of scienter was involved. 37 Al-

though satisfied with his textual analysis, Justice Powell turned to
other sections of the statute and the legislative history to determine

whether these sources supported the arguments made by the plaintiffs
and the SEC.3 8 He found particularly persuasive in this regard the
35. 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
36. Ernst & Ernst served as accountants to First Securities Company of Chicago,
which had allegedly defrauded its clients, including plaintiffs, through the use of false
accounts for 24 years. The fraud was discovered in 1968 when the president of First
Securities committed suicide, leaving a note which revealed that the company was
bankrupt and the accounts were false. Although no record of the false accounts appeared in any of First Securities books and records, plaintiffs contended that a proper
audit would have uncovered the fraud by discovering the president's special rule which
allowed no one else to open mail addressed to him. 96 S. Ct. at 1378-80.
The Seventh Circuit held that Ernst & Ernst had -a statutory and common law duty
of inquiry and that the plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the duty would have a valid action
under lOb-5 if there had been a breach which caused plaintiffs' loss. Hochfelder v.
Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
37. 96 S. Ct. at 1391. Justice Powell used scienter to mean "intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud." Id. He noted that several courts of appeals had held that
negligence alone was sufficient to support a private action under lOb-5. Id. n.12; see
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) ("flexible duty" standard); Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)
(intent to deceive not required); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963)
(knowledge not required).
The scienter requirement question is part of a larger debate over the relationship
between the elements of common law fraud (i.e., misrepresentation, privity, scienter,
causation, materiality, and reliance) and rule lob-5 fraud. Courts have gradually
relaxed the requirements for fraud under the rule. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). See Bucklo,
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972) for a discussion of the diverse
treatment courts have given to scienter. Justice Powell, looking directly to the statute,
did not discuss the role of common law fraud in Ernst & Ernst. He found that the text
of the statute itself required that scienter be present and thus did not enter the debate
over the role of common law fraud under section 10(b). This is consistent with his emphasis on the statute as the foundation of the rule, since the term "fraud" was introduced
into rule lOb-5 but is not found in the statute itself. See note 58 infra.
38. 96 S. CL at 1385-87. As in Blue Chip, the SEC, which has been active in
expanding the private right of action, filed an amicus brief for the plaintiffs. See 3
BRomBERG § 10(1). In his concurrence in Blue Chip, Justice Powell took exception to
the Commission's attempt to rewrite the 1934 Act through judicial action. 421 U.S.
at 759-60 n.4; see note 49 infra and accompanying text. See also United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25 (1975) (SEC criticized for inconsistent positions in case restricting reach of term "security").
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procedural limitations which Congress placed on the civil remedies which
it expressly provided elsewhere in the statute."9 In a passage which
echoed Justice Harlan's earlier concerns, Justice Powell reasoned that
these carefully drawn Congressional limitations would be nullified if
the Court made negligent misconduct actionable under lOb-5, with its
broad procedural advantages.40 In light of his conclusion that the
statute and its history gave a clear answer on the negligence issue, Justice Powell noted that the policy considerations invoked in the Blue Chip
decision did not need to be reached.41
Taken together, Blue Chip and Ernst & Ernst establish a new

method for analyzing the proper scope of the private right of action
under rule lOb-5. The Court will first examine the statute and the
rule; if the answer is unclear from the text, legislative history and other
extrinsic evidence will be consulted. Where the Court remains uncertain of the proper construction, it is not clear whether it will weigh
policy considerations as it did in Blue Chip. Despite their differences,
both Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist accept the statute as carefully drawn. The implication of this view is that the competing policy
choices have already been weighed and decided upon by Congress, and
that the Court should therefore limit itself to a careful search for clues
to congressional intent, rather than attempt an independent reevaluation of policy factors.
Although the flexible approach toward lOb-5 taken in earlier
cases has not been specifically rejected, there is strong evidence that it
has fallen from favor. In Blue Chip, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged
42
the Court's prior holdings that rule lOb-5 should be construed flexibly.
He noted, however, that the private cause of action under 1Ob-5 is a
judicial creation which must "be judicially delimited one way or another
unless and until Congress addresses the question; ' 43 hence, the more
39. 96 S. Ct. at 1387-89. Justice Powell noted, as Justice Harlan had earlier, see
note 17 supra, that those bringing suit under sections 11, 12(2) and 15 of the 1933
Act must post a bond for costs. He also pointed to the reduced statute of limitations
in section 13, which applies to those suing under sections 11, 12(2), and 15. He
stressed that two of these procedural safeguards, the shortened statute of limitations
and the security for costs provision of section l(e), particularly concerned Congress,
as they were added to the 1933 Act by amendment in the 1934 Act. See note 29 supra.
40. 96 S. Ct. at 1389. See notes 17, 29 and 39 supra.
41. Id. at 1391 n.33.
42. 421 U.S. at 748-49. See notes 12-21 supra and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 749. Justice Rehnquist's emphasis on the need to delimit the private
right of action (described as a "judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn," id. at 737) suggests a subtle but basic difference between his approach and that of Justice Powell. See note 31 supra and notes 46-50 infra and
accompanying text. This difference is manifest in Justice Rehnquist's eagerness to
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liberal earlier precedent does not "militate . . . against the Birnbaum
rule."44 Despite this attempt to harmonize the Blue Chip holding with

the earlier cases, it seems unlikely that Justice Rehnquist would engage in flexible construction of what he considers to be a "carefully

drawn" statute. A liberal reading of lOb-5 would seem particularly
foreign to one who believes that "the inexorable broadening of the
class of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately
result in more harm than good."45
Justice Powell has attacked the doctrine of flexible interpretation
more directly. He began his opinion in Ernst & Ernst with a carefully
formulated statement outlining the distinct purposes of the 1933 and
1934 Acts.4 6 In rejecting the SEC's argument for a flexible interpretation, Justice Powell asserted that the reading of a negligence standard

of liability into section 10(b) would be inconsistent with the explicit
provision of such a standard in other sections of the Act.47 When
Congress did choose to provide for negligence liability, it enacted specific
procedural safeguards which are lacking in 10(b).48

Therefore, he

concluded, section 10(b) does not provide the protection which Congress apparently felt to be a necessary adjunct to negligence liability.

The SEC was criticized for attempting to "add a gloss" to the statutory
language by arguing that the Court should focus on the effect of the

alleged fraudulent practice on the investor, rather than directing its
attention to whether the alleged fraud was negligent or intentional.49
The Powell opinion in Ernst & Ernst stressed the fact that while rule

lOb-5 might be read in the abstract as prohibiting a wide variety of
weigh policy and thereby defeat 10b-5 expansionists on their own ground, while Justice
Powell is satisfied with analyzing the statute. See notes 30-34, 37-38 supra and accompanying text. The difference implies that in a close case Justice Powelrs careful
analysis of the statute might support expansion of 10b-5 while policy arguments of the
sort made by Justice Rehnquist would call for an opposite conclusion.
44. 421 U.S. at 749.
45. Id. at 747-48.
46. 96 S. Ct. at 1381-82. See text accompanying notes 74-76 infra.
47. Id. at 1388-89. For example, Justice Powell cited section 11 of the 1933 Act,
which provides for a private right of action based on a negligence standard. He argued
that the express recognition of such a standard in section 11 "significantly undercuts" the
argument for 10(b) negligence liability. For a general discussion of this type of
reasoning, see note 29 supra.
48. 96 S. Ct. at 1388-89. See note 39, supra.
49. 96 S. Ct. at 1383. Justice Powell appears to be particularly sensitive to the
statutory language. His concurrence in Blue Chip seemed to accept the judicial creation
of a private right of action under section 10(b) in part because "it was unnecessary to
rewrite the precise language of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 759 (1975).
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fraudulent practices, the statute is the essential source of rule 10b-5's
power, and therefore must set the outer limits of the rule's scope.5°
The Second Circuit's decisions in Marshel v. AFW Corp.5" and
Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. 2 employed a sharply contrasting,

highly flexible interpretation of rule 10b-5.

The fuller opinions in

Green clearly set forth the bases for the decisions.5 3

Judge Medina,

speaking for the court in Green, asserted that
. . . Rule 10b-5 must be interpreted and applied so as to accomplish
the purpose for which it was intended. That this requires a generous
54
reading is too obvious for comment.
He went on to argue that a finding of fraud under 10b-5 was not de-

pendent upon the presence of misrepresentation, concluding that an
equitable definition of fraud 55 would include situations in which controlling shareholders breached their "fiduciary duty to deal fairly with
50. 96 S. Ct. at 1390-91. See notes 7 & 37 supra and note 58 infra.
51. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3720 (U.S. June
8, 1976).
52. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S. May
14, 1976). See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
53. The Marshel opinion was less explicit than that in Green, but it did employ
prior 5ase law which had itself used a flexible construction. See Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 732
(1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969).
In general, the analysis which follows will focus on Green; analysis of Marshel
would, in the context of this Note, parallel that of Green.
It should be noted that in both Marshel and Green the plaintiff would have had
standing under the forced-seller exception to the Birnbaum rule. See Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). Whether this
exception has survived Blue Chip is at least questionable. Allowing the forced-seller
exception would seem not to raise the specter of fact-oriented case-by-case erosion of
Birnbaum which concerned Justice Rehnquist. In the forced-seller situation, a complaint will not depend entirely on oral testimony, and Birnbaum will itself be satisfied
by the formality of completion of the merger, at which time the minority will have
exchanged its stock for either the offered price or the appraised price. See notes 24-34
supra and accompanying text. One commentator, however, has already concluded that
the forced-seller exception is no longer valid. Gallagher, 10b-5 After Blue Chip
Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DiC. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1975).
The Green court did not discuss the possible effect of Blue Chip on the case. The
opinion merely noted without discussion that a forced sale was involved. 533 F.2d at
1287 & nn. 3, 4.
54. 533 F.2d at 1287.
55. Id. at 1289-90. Judge Medina relied on SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 374 U.S. 180 (1963), in developing his broad definition of rule lOb-5 fraud:
Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of equity properly includes all acts,
omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which
an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. Id. at 194,
quoting Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1888).
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minority shareholders by effecting [a] merger without any justifiable
business purpose."5 6
Judge Mansfield's concurrence in Green generally paralleled Judge

Medina's opinion. After noting the potential effects on the securities
industry of the use of the short-form merger as a means of going
private, 7 he focused on the overall anti-fraud purposes of rule lOb-5.
Judge Mansfield's sole reference to the statute consisted of a citation to
Bankers Life, in which he observed that that case taught that "[s]ection
10(b) must be read flexibly.""8 The concurrence noted that if public
shareholders "are to enjoy the protection intended to be furnished by

10b-5, that rule must not be interpreted in a technical or niggardly
fashion,"9 and acknowledged the Second Circuit's "steady trend toward
an expansive view of the reach of the federal securities laws."00
It seems clear that the claims advanced by the plaintiffs in Green
would be analyzed differently under the narrower interpretive guidelines
laid down in Blue Chip and Ernst & Ernst. One would begin with
the "starting point in every case involving the construction of a statute"
---"the language itself."'" Section 10(b) prohibits the use of a "deceptive or manipulative device or contrivance." 62 To come within the
56. 533 F.2d at 1291. For recent discussions of the corporate purpose test, see
Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974); Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.
1974). See note 6 supra.
57. 533 F.2d at 1295-96.
58. Id. at 1296-97, quoting Superintendent of Ins. V. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 12 (1971):
The recognition that "fraud" as that term is used in § 10(b) must be interpreted broadly was given further impetus by the Supreme Court's decision
in [Bankers Life] where, in holding that fraud forming the basis of a lob-5
suit need not be intrinsic to the securities transaction itself, the unanimous
Court stated that "Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically or
restrictively . ..

.

In the context of the Powell-Rehnquist analysis, with its heavy emphasis on the text of
the statute, it is worthy of note that, contrary to the implication of Judge Mansfield's
concurrence, the term "fraud" appears nowhere in the text of section 10(b); rather, it
is derived from rule IOb-5.
59. 533 F.2d at 1296.
60. Id. at 1297.
61. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Inc., 421 U.S. 723, 756 (Powell, J.,
concurring). The point was re-emphasized in Justice Powell's opinion for the Court
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1383 (1976), wherein he quoted his
earlier concurrence.
62. See note 7 supra. In order to find deception, one would need to refer to the
investor's expectations at the time the stock was purchased, see Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965), and argue that the corporation
had failed to disclose that the shareholder might be forced to resell his stock to the
corporation in a going private transaction. This already tenuous argument is further
complicated by the existence of short-form merger statutes in many states, under which
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scope of the statute, a procedure such as that employed in Green must
therefore involve either deception or manipulation. It is difficult to
see how going private under a short-form merger statute would constitute a deceptive device in itself. The decision in Green did not rest

upon the limited nondisclosure allegations in the complaint; 3 the court
held specifically that "[i]f there is no valid corporate purpose for the
merger, then even the most brazen disclosure of that fact to the minority
shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent conduct."' 4
Absent deception, a decision for a plaintiff under the facts of
Green must, under the Blue Chip/Ernst& Ernst analysis, depend upon

a finding that use of the short-form merger to squeeze out minority
shareholders constitutes a "manipulative device or contrivance." Justice Powell emphasized in Ernst & Ernst that "manipulative" "is and

was virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities
markets . . . connot[ing] intentional or willful conduct designed to

deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the
price of securities."

5

While the construction put upon the term by

Justice Powell is hardly apparent from the face of section 10(b), it
has considerable support in the legislative history of the statute. Section
9 of the 1934 Act, subtitled "Manipulation of security prices," specifically proscribes a number of stock market activities, notably wash
sales, matched buy-sell orders, and the making of false statements by

brokers.0 0 In testimony regarding a predecessor of section 9, 67 Thomas
G. Corcoran, one of the drafters of the 1934 Act stated that that sec-

tion "embodies a proposal with which few people would disagree"-the proscription of the particular manipulative devices enumerated
therein.0 8 Addressing himself next to the predecessor of section 10,"
an investor might be held to be on notice of prospective forced sales. Ernst & Ernst
would also require that a plaintiff show that the corporation intended to deceive him at
the time of purchase and that the misrepresentation was part of a plan to go public and
then private. 96 S. Ct. at 1383-84.
63. The complaint alleged a failure to disclose the merger plans until after the
merger had been effected. 533 F.2d at 1288.
64. Id. at 1292.
65. 96 S. Ct. at 1384.
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
Wash sales are transactions involving no change in beneficial ownership.
Matched orders are orders for the purchase/sale of a security that are entered
with the knowledge that orders of substantially the same size, at substantially
the same time and price, have been or will be entered by the same or different
persons for the sale/purchase of such security. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
96 S. Ct. 1375, 1386 n.25 (1976).
67. S. 2693 and H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1934).
68. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1934).
69. S. 2693 and H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1934), reproduced in
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Corcoran testified that it
. . . forbids short-selling and stop-loss orders except in accordance
with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Commission. Subsection (c) says, "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices."
Of course subsection (c) is a catchall clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there is any objection to that kind of

clause. The Commission should have authority to deal with new
70
manipulative devices.

Corcoran's testimony clearly indicates that sections 9 and 10 of the
1934 Act were intended to complement one another. Section 9 proscribes enumerated manipulative devices generally agreed to be ob-

noxious.

Section 10 gives further rulemaking power to the Com-

mission to regulate the use of short sales and stop-loss orders, the legiti-

mate utility of which was in issue, 71 and to proscribe any similar manipulative devices whose novelty had eluded the ingenuity of the draftsmen.
The above analysis would indicate that the "manipulation" sub-

jected to the Commission's regulation under section 10(b) must be
price manipulation of the same character as that covered by section

9. Under the Ernst & Ernst holding, practices not reached by section
10(b) cannot be violative of rule lOb-5; 72 if Justice Powell's defini-

tion of "manipulative" is correct, 1Ob-5 claims such as those advanced
in Green and Marshel must fail absent proof of deception. This restrictive reading of "manipulative" will not, of course, foreclose relief
Hearings, supra note 68, at 7. While § 9(c) of S. 2693 and H.R. 7852 clearly is the
lineal ancestor of § 10(b), there were significant differences between the enacted and
unenacted versions. Compare § 9(c) of S. 2693:
[It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ..
To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
... any device or contrivance which, or any device or contrivance in a way
or manner which the Commission may by its rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors.
with § 10(b):
[It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . .
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
*..any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors (emphasis
added).
70. Hearings,supra note 68, at 115. See generally 1 BRoMEMO § 2.2.
71. This section ... relates to matters which a great many people think ought
to be absolutely forbidden ....
The theory of this bill is that no one yet
knows enough about short selling to know whether it should be legislated out
of existence, or whether it might not be handled as a possibly useful tool of the
market under regulations devised by the Commission. Hearings,supra note 68,
at 115.
72. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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for all such plaintiffs; it is not uncommon -for majority shareholders contemplating going private to omit dividends or misrepresent the corporation's future prospects in an effort to depress the value of the
minority's interest and acquire it inexpensively. Plaintiffs thus squeezed
out would arguably have a cause of action under 10b-5, based upon
73

the specific price-manipulative aspects of the transaction.
While withholding federal relief from a Green-type plaintiff might

seem contrary to the policy of the securities statutes as outlined in the

earlier cases, that policy itself has been redefined in Ernst & Ernst. The
aim of the securities laws, under Justice Powell's analysis, is not the
broad "protection of investors. ' 4 The purpose of the 1934 Act is
limited, rather, to cleansing the market of "manipulation of stock prices
through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and over-

the-counter markets, and [imposing] regular reporting requirements on
75
companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges.1
Insofar as manipulation and nondisclosure were lacking under the
facts of Green and Marshel, this more limited purpose of the 1934

Act was not contravened by the defendants' conduct, however harmful
that conduct may have been to the general welfare of the squeezed-out
investors.

8

73. But see Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976). The court
held that "manipulation of the market price of the stock by eliminating dividends, with
prior full disclosure" did not violate rule 10b-5. Id. at 983, 987. The court distinguished Green and Marshel on the ground that in those cases the shareholders
attacked the going private merger itself as fraud. In Marsh the attack was not on the
merger, in which the minority shareholders were given a chance to remain in the
surviving company, but on its terms. The Sixth Circuit concluded that deception must
be alleged to maintain a claim where the purpose of the merger is not challenged.
Id. at 986.
74. See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text.
75. 96 S. Ct. at 1382.
76. It is probably unnecessary to weigh broader policy considerations in analyzing
Green and Marshel under the Supreme Court's current rubric, as the disposition of the
cases seems clear from the language and legislative history of section 10(b). See notes
61-75 supra and accompanying text. Possible policy considerations would, however,
include the vexatious litigation problem emphasized by Justice Rehnquist in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), and mentioned by Justice Powell
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1391 n.33 (1976). It is feared that
elimination of the requirement of misrepresentation or nondisclosure as an element
of 10b-5 fraud would significantly expand litigation in this area, particularly under a
vague standard of "equitable fraud." The facts of Green, however, did not present the
oral testimony problem which was raised by the prospective abandonment of the
Birnbaum rule considered in Blue Chip. See note 32 supra.
The Court has also expressed concern for providing clearly delineated legal standards in order to ensure certainty in business transactions. The concepts of equitable
fraud and justifiable business purpose employed by the Green court, see notes 55-56

Vol. 1976:7891

RULE lob-5

Prior to Blue Chip and Ernst & Ernst, minority shareholders excluded from corporate ownership by going private transactions might
have expected to obtain federal relief under a steadily expanding rule
lOb-5. After Blue Chip and Ernst & Ernst those expectations would
seem to have little hope of realization. In both cases the Supreme Court
took a position on the substantive questions which tended to halt the

growth of the private right of action under rule 10b-5. 71

More ira-

supra and accompanying text, do not lend themselves to the setting of precise boundaries;
they involve, rather, case-by-case adjudication, providing less than clear notice of the
state of the law. Developments of this sort are clearly contrary to the philosophy of
Blue Chip.
The above concepts are interrelated to such an extent that they can scarcely
be analyzed as separate entities. Green did, however, involve an independent policy
question which was not present in either Blue Chip or Ernst & Ernst. The transaction
in issue was carried out under the Delaware short-form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 253 (1975). The state courts had approved this procedure, finding no violation
of a fiduciary duty by the majority shareholders. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 10, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962):
The dispute reduces to nothing but a difference of opinion as to value.
Indeed it is difficult to imagine a case under the short merger statute in which
there could be such actual fraud as would entitle a minority to set aside the
merger. This is so because the very purpose of the statute is to provide the
parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's
interest in the enterprise. Thereafter the former stockholder has only a
monetary claim. This power of the parent corporation to eliminate the minority is a complete answer to plaintiff's charge of breach of trust against the
directors .

. .

. Id. at 80.

See also Application of Del. Racing Ass'n, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 213 A.2d 203 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
Green raised the question of the relationship between federal securities statutes and
state law governing fiduciary relationships-the extent to which a federal court can redefine the boundaries of such corporate relationships after a state has expressly approved
a method of dealing. While this may be in part a question of preemption, it is also an
aspect of the question of federal-state comity. Where, as in the case of section 10(b),
the federal statute is not clear in its reach, then this factor should at least give pause to
a federal court before a federal remedy is expanded at the expense of state law.
77. Blue Chip and Ernst & Ernst may signal a halt to the growth of federal corporate common law based on section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, see note 22 supra, a development which had been generally recognized. See Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722,
729 (1971), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing en banc, 453 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972);
In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (Cary, Commissioner);
Loss 3875 (Supp.); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 413 (1964). In most instances the results of this expanding federal jurisdiction were applauded, as it seemed the most equitable response
to the increasing laxity of state corporate regulation. See Bahiman, Rule 10b-5: The
Case for its Full Acceptance as Federal CorporationLaw, 37 U. CIN. L REV. 727, 731
(1968); Jennings, Federalization of CorporationLaw: Part Way or All the Way, 31
Bus. LAw. 991 (1976); Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Security Code
Project, 25 Bus. LAw. 27, 34 (1969). Nonetheless, there was concern that "the way
the courts have proceeded is . . . offensive occasionally to one's sense of the integrity
of the legislative process." Loss, Wrap-Up, 31 Bus. LAw. 1193, 1195 (1976).
The Supreme Court's current position lends new emphasis to the importance of the
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portantly, the Court demonstrated that it will no longer accept the
equity-oriented, flexible approach which the lower courts have followed
in expanding the scope of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. As a replacement the Court has substituted a tightly reasoned method of analysis
which rests firmly on the language of the statute and the intent with
which the language was used by Congress.
The Court's current approach to lOb-5 questions apparently does
not threaten the continued existence of the private right of action under
rule lOb-5. However, its position does reflect the concerns expressed
by the early cases and the commentators over the need for harmonizing
the remedy provided by the private right of action under lOb-5 with
the specific remedies provided in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. These
concerns had been ignored by the Supreme Court in its previous lOb-5
cases. The Court's new emphasis on a strict construction of the statute
promises to have a profound effect on future actions brought under.rule
lOb-5. As for those who had hoped to obtain federal relief in a going
private situation, it appears that they will have to wait for some action
by Congress while continuing to rely on existing state remedies.
legislative role. The next step may lie in the direction of congressional consideration
of a Federal Securities Code. The ALI's work on such a code has already produced
three drafts which would codify over 20 changes in the 10b-5 area. See id. at 1196-97.

